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The Boston Gun Project was a
problem-oriented policing initiative
expressly aimed at reducing
homicide victimization among
youths in Boston in the mid 1990s
(Kennedy et al., 1996; Kennedy 
et al., 2001).  It represented an
innovative partnership between
researchers and practitioners to
assess the city's youth homicide
problem and implement an inter-
vention designed to have a sub-
stantial near-term impact on the
problem. 
Project research showed that the
problem of youth homicide was
concentrated among a small num-
ber of chronically offending gang-
involved youth. Project research
also showed that firearms associ-
ated with youth, especially with
gang youth, tended to be semi-
automatic pistols, often ones that
were quite new and apparently
recently diverted from retail.  Many
of these guns were first sold at
retail in Massachusetts as well as
being smuggled into Boston from
out of state.  The Project began in
early 1995 and implemented
what is now known as the
"Operation Ceasefire" intervention
beginning on May 15, 1996.  The
Ceasefire intervention had two
main elements: (1) the "pulling
levers" focused deterrence strate-
gy to prevent gang violence, and
(2) a direct law enforcement attack
on illicit firearms traffickers supply-
ing youth with guns.
The Boston Police Department
and Harvard University researchers
initiated the Boston Gun Project
work by approaching key criminal
justice and social service stake-
holders in Boston to support a
research and development
process by designating one key
line-level person to participate in
a working group.  These stake-
holders initially included
Massachusetts Probation,
Massachusetts Department of
Youth Services (juvenile correc-
tions), Suffolk County District
Attorney's Office, U.S. Attorney's
Office, Bureau of Alcohol,
Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF),
and Boston Community Centers.
In the working group setting,
practitioners discussed their
views on the nature of youth gun
violence in Boston and Harvard
researchers used available infor-
mation resources to closely
examine these insights to create
a detailed description of the gun
violence problem.  
Project research showed that the problem of
youth homicide was concentrated among a
small number of chronically offending gang-
involved youth.
With the benefit of a clear
description of the problem, the
interagency working group devel-
oped a new approach to preventing
youth violence known as Operation
Ceasefire.  The violence prevention
plans were presented to the execu-
tives of the key agencies involved in
the initiative.  The executives
approved the violence prevention
plans and pledged to support the
implementation of the new
approach.
Deterring Gang
Violence
The Boston Police Department's
Youth Violence Strike Force (YVSF),
an elite unit of some 40 officers and
detectives, coordinated the actions
of Operation Ceasefire.  An intera-
gency working group, comprised of
law enforcement personnel, youth
workers, and members of Boston's
Ten Point Coalition of activist black
clergy, was convened on a bi-
weekly basis to address outbreaks
of serious gang violence.  
Operation Ceasefire's "pulling
levers" strategy was designed to
deter gang violence by reaching out
directly to gangs, saying explicitly
that violence would no longer be
tolerated, and backing up that
message by "pulling every lever"
legally available when violence
occurred (Kennedy, 1997).  These
law enforcement levers included
disrupting street-level drug markets,
serving warrants, mounting federal
prosecutions, and changing the
conditions of community supervi-
sion for probationers and parolees
in the targeted group.
Simultaneously, youth workers, pro-
bation and parole officers, and cler-
gy offered gang members services
and other kinds of help.  If gang
members wanted to step away
from a violent lifestyle, the Ceasefire
working group focused on provid-
ing them with the services and
opportunities necessary to make
the transition.
The Ceasefire Working Group deliv-
ered their anti-violence message in
formal meetings with gang mem-
bers; through individual police and
probation contacts with gang mem-
bers; through meetings with
inmates of secure juvenile facilities
in the city; and through gang out-
reach workers.  The deterrence
message was not a deal with gang
members to stop violence.  Rather,
it was a promise to gang members
that violent behavior would evoke
an immediate and intense
response.  If gangs committed
other crimes but refrained from vio-
lence, the normal workings of
police, prosecutors, and the rest of
the criminal justice system dealt
with these matters.  But if gang
members hurt people, the Working
Group focused its enforcement
actions on them.
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A large reduction in the yearly
number of Boston youth homi-
cides followed immediately after
Operation Ceasefire was imple-
mented in mid-1996. A U.S.
National Institute of Justice (NIJ)
sponsored evaluation found that
the Ceasefire intervention was
associated with a 63% reduction
in Boston youth homicide and
similar large reductions in non-fatal
serious gun violence (Braga et al.,
2001).  This reduction was sus-
tained for the next five years (see
Figure 1).  The Ceasefire program,
as designed, was in place until
2000.  
During the early years of new mil-
lennium, the Boston Police experi-
mented with a broader approach
to violence prevention by expand-
ing certain Ceasefire tactics to a
broader range of problems such
as serious repeat violent gun
offenders, the re-entry of incarcer-
ated violent offenders back into
high-risk Boston neighborhoods,
and criminogenic families in hot
spot areas.  These new approach-
es, known broadly as Boston
Strategy II, seemed to diffuse the
ability of Boston to respond to
ongoing conflicts among gangs.
Youth homicide, most of which is
gang related, has returned as a
serious problem for the City of
Boston.  In Fall 2004, the Boston
Police implemented a new vio-
lence prevention campaign, which
borrows heavily from Ceasefire's
tight focus on disrupting cycles of
violent gang retribution (For addi-
tional discussion of the implemen-
tation of Ceasefire, see Kennedy,
Braga, and Piehl, 2001; Braga and
Winship, 2005).
Disrupting Illegal
Gun Markets
The interagency Boston Gun
Project working group also devel-
oped a gun market disruption
strategy to address the patterns of
illegal diversion identified by the
research.  The resulting strategy
was appropriately focused on the
illegal diversion of new handguns
from retail outlets in
Massachusetts and elsewhere.
For investigative and tactical
purposes, guns with quick time-
to-crime offer law enforcement an
opportunity to identify illegal gun
traffickers.  New guns have
passed through fewer hands and
this makes it much easier for law
enforcement to investigate its
diversion and its diverters, and to
mount prosecutions.  
Records are likely to be more
complete and more available;
individuals listed on paperwork are
easier to find; guns are less likely
to have been resold, given away,
or stolen; and the chain of
transfers to illicit consumers is
likely to be shorter (Kennedy et al.
1996).  While youth handguns
were given investigative priority,
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the gun trafficking initiative was
intended to reduce the general
availability of new handguns to all
gun-using criminals in Boston,
regardless of possessor age.  The
key elements of the Ceasefire gun
market disruption strategy were
(summarized from Kennedy et al.,
2001):
- Expanded focus of local, state,
and federal authorities to include
intrastate firearms trafficking in
Massachusetts in addition to inter-
state trafficking.
- Focused enforcement attention
on traffickers of the makes and
calibers of handguns most used
by gang members.
- Focused enforcement attention
on traffickers of handguns that had
short time-to-crime intervals and,
thus, were most likely to have
been trafficked.  The ATF Boston
Field Division implemented an in-
house tracking system that flagged
handguns whose traces revealed a
short time-to-crime interval.
- Focused enforcement attention
on traffickers of handguns used by
the city's most violent gangs.
- Attempted to restore obliterated
serial numbers of confiscated
handguns and subsequently inves-
tigate trafficking based on these
restorations.
- Supported these enforcement
priorities through strategic analy-
ses of data generated by the
Boston Police Department and
ATF's comprehensive tracing of
crime guns and by developing
leads from the systematic debrief-
ing of gang-affiliated arrestees and
those involved in violent crime.
- Deliberate communication of
successful investigations and pros-
ecutions of gun traffickers to deter
others from diverting firearms from
retail sources to criminals and
youth in Boston.
A U.S. National Institute of Justice
sponsored evaluation found that
the Ceasefire intervention was
associated with a 23% reduction
in the monthly percentage of
recovered crime handguns that
were new.  Ceasefire had a signifi-
cant impact on the supply of new
handguns to criminals in Boston
(Braga and Pierce, 2005).
The Role of Ballistics
Imaging Technology
In March 1995, Boston was one of
the first major cities to receive IBIS
ballistics imaging technology from
the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco,
Firearms, and Explosives (ATF).
The system was considered fully
implemented when the Boston
Police Department Ballistics Unit
made its first IBIS match in July
1995 (Braga and Pierce, 2004).
Since adopting the technology, the
BPD test fires all recovered crime
guns and the expended bullets
and cartridge casings are imaged
and entered into the IBIS database
(Braga and Pierce, 2004). 
Confirmed IBIS matches are a key
part of the BPD's evolving gun vio-
lence reduction strategies (from
Operation Ceasefire to the newly
implemented Street Violence
Suppression Project).  Every two
weeks, the Boston Police convene
an interagency working group
comprised of BPD officers and
detectives, ATF agents, Assistant
U.S. Attorneys, Assistant Suffolk
County District Attorneys,
Massachusetts State Police,
Massachusetts Probation officers,
Department of Youth Services
(juvenile corrections) case workers,
and other criminal justice practi-
tioners as needed.  This meeting
serves as a scanning and analysis
forum for ongoing conflicts among
violent gangs and other gun inci-
dents with high potential for retali-
ation. 
After specific violence problems
are identified, BPD officers and
detectives are assigned responsi-
bility for devising and implementing
appropriate violence prevention
plans to halt outbreaks of violence.
Strategies are developed at a sep-
arate response development meet-
ing; however, implemented plans
and progress updates are present-
ed at the bi-weekly meetings to
disseminate knowledge on what
works (and what doesn't) and to
hold officers responsible for keep-
ing targeted groups and individuals
from shooting at each other.
At the routine scanning and analy-
sis meetings, BPD crime analysts
and intelligence officers present
information on gun incidents over
the previous two weeks.  Recent
IBIS matches are highlighted at the
beginning of each meeting.  
Members of the working group
discuss the circumstances associ-
ated with the linked incidents;
information developed through
interviews with arrested offenders,
victims, and witnesses; available
intelligence on current "beefs"
between gangs or the activities of
serious violent offenders in the
linked areas, and analyses of other
physical evidence collected at the
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crime scenes, such as DNA and
fingerprints.  If guns are recovered
and successfully traced by ATF,
information on the first retail pur-
chaser and licensed dealer are
presented.  In essence, an "infor-
mation chain" is constructed
around the events linked by ballis-
tics evidence.  The amount and
types of information associated
with linked gun crime events can
vary tremendously across matches
(see Figure 2). 
A recent evaluation suggests that
the IBIS technology significantly
increased the productivity of the
BPD Ballistics Unit in linking guns
crimes (Braga and Pierce, 2004).
The analysis found that the adop-
tion of the IBIS technology was
associated with a more than 6-fold
increase in the number of cold hit
matches per month.  Clearly, the
IBIS technology significantly
increases the ability of law enforce-
ment agencies to make ballistics
matches across crime scenes.  
The cost effectiveness estimates
and qualitative evidence also sug-
gests that the IBIS technology
allows law enforcement agencies
to make hits that would have oth-
erwise not been possible.  Before
IBIS was adopted by the BPD,
ballistics matching across gun
crime scenes was an ad-hoc and
tedious process.  Now, the BPD
can systematically compare recov-
ered gun crime evidence to its
entire inventory of evidence with
little effort.  The research also
found that serious violent offenders
who were well known to the crimi-
nal justice system were involved in
crimes linked through IBIS match-
es.  IBIS matches were also asso-
ciated with high conviction rates
for these offenders.
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